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Comparison of varying GHG calculation and pricing systems



This document provides an overview of the essential components of varying carbon pricing and calculation systems.

The European Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS), the ECO parallel climate currency and the Upstream ETS are volume-based systems that put a ceiling (cap) on the amount of fossil fuel emissions permitted.

The German emissions certificate trade (carbon tax) and carbon tax with climate dividends are systems without a cap and solely limit pollutants via inflationary pricing.

As yet to be established systems, the ECO climate emissions currency and upstream ETS are alternative solutions which ensure that the Paris Agreement emissions goals are met.

| Essential differences between the varying systems | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | ECO | EU-ETS | Upstream ETS | Carbon tax with climate dividends | Carbon tax | | | |
| System design | Personal carbon credit trade implementing a parallel currency (volume solution). | Industrial carbon credit trade limited to major carbon-emitting sectors (volume solution). | Carbon credit for fossil fuel conveyors (volume solution). | Energy tax combined with eco dividends (pricing solution). | Carbon emissions tax levied on certain sectors (pricing solution). | | | |
| | Personal carbon credit allowance for all end consumers (citizen-level), | Auctioned carbon credit certificates (cap and trade) | Carbon credits are auctioned certificates (cap and trade) | | | | | |
| | distributed as a cost-free basic ecological income in the form of the ECO – a parallel climate currency (cap, personalize and trade). | Costs are transferred onto product prices, generating price increases which disproportionately overburden low-income households. | Costs are transferred onto product prices, generating price increases which disproportionately overburden low-income households. | The resulting price increases disproportionately overburden low-income households. | The resulting price increases disproportionately overburden low-income households. | | | |
| | Distributed free of cost, the ECO does not result in price hikes nor does it burden low-income households. | A portion of certificates is currently distributed free of cost. | | 2/3 of incoming revenue is repaid to qualifying citizens in eco dividends. | | | | |

| Efficacy | Emission goals are met | Emission goals are not met | Emission goals are met | Emission goals are not met | Emission goals are not met |
|-------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | since ECO distribution is | since the system only | since certificate | since the system only | since the system only |
| | directly linked to carbon | applies to selected sectors | distribution is directly | applies to selected sectors. | applies to selected sectors. |
| | emission limits. | and heating production. | linked to carbon emission | The system generates price | The system generates |
| | | | limits. | increases without | price increases without |
| | | | | providing alternative | providing alternative |
| | | | | consumer options, | consumer options, |
| | | | | resulting in insufficient | resulting in insufficient |
| | | | | reduction of GHG. | reduction of GHG. |
| Working principle | Shortage | Shortage and price | Shortage and price | Price increases | Price increases |
| | | increases | increases | | |
| | Confronted with a limited | GHG is lowered by | A reduction in the | Inflationary prices aim to | Inflationary prices aim to |
| | carbon credit allowance, | auctioning off a limited | manufacture of pollutive | deter climate damaging | deter climate damaging |
| | consumers' demand will | number of carbon credits | products and services is | consumer habits. The | consumer habits. The |
| | automatically shift further | which can be traded by the | attained by limiting carbon | population is thusly | population is thusly |
| | from climate damaging | companies. The number of | credits (cap). | encouraged to limit | encouraged to limit |
| | products and services to | credits are valid for a | | carbon-intensive | carbon-intensive |
| | climate friendly ones – | predetermined trade | Certificate costs are | consumption or choose | consumption or choose |
| | those with a lower ECO | period. Certificate costs | transferred to products, | climate-friendly products. | climate-friendly products. |
| | price. This will directly | are transferred to | directly generating | | |
| | motivate a trend toward | products, directly | inflationary prices for | | |
| | ecological industrial | generating inflationary | consumers and thus, a | | |
| | manufacturing processes, | prices for consumers and | carbon pricing signal. | | |
| | in turn lowering GHG. | thus, a carbon pricing | | | |
| | | signal. | | | |
| | | | | | 1 |

| Transparency/ | The ECO represents the | Since certificate costs are | The separate euro climate | Since carbon costs are | Since carbon costs are |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Price manipulation | sum total of GHG | compounded with | price reflects the entire | compounded with | compounded with |
| security | generated throughout the | economic product prices, it | value chain. | economic product prices, it | economic product prices, it |
| | entire chain of supply. | is nearly impossible for end | | is nearly impossible for end | is nearly impossible for |
| | | users to discern the | However, the trade period | users to discern the | end users to discern the |
| | This allows consumers to | climate impact of a given | of certificate prices | climate impact of a given | climate impact of a given |
| | directly compare varying | product. | diminish the ecological | product. | product. |
| | products' climate impact | | statement's accuracy. | | |
| | and consciously choose the | The extra charge | | The extra charge | The extra charge |
| | more environmentally | representing a product's | Controlling authorities | representing a product's | representing a product's |
| | friendly product. | carbon footprint cannot be | must be alert to and | carbon footprint cannot be | carbon footprint cannot be |
| | | clearly traced. | prevent illicit product | clearly traced. | clearly traced. |
| | The final ECO price is | | placement (green | | |
| | automatically correct, as | | washing). | | |
| | industries are prohibited | | | | |
| | from trading ECOs on the | | Consumers have no | | |
| | ECO exchange market. | | comparative scale for | | |
| | | | validating the ecological | | |
| | This eliminates the risk of | | price. | | |
| | price manipulation. | | | | |
| | | | | | |

| | Resource currency ECO (CAP, Personalize and Trade) | Carbon certificate trade (CAP and Trade) EU-ETS (European Union Emissions Trading System) | | Upstream ETS | Carbon tax with climate dividends (Fee and Dividend) | Carbon tax |
|--|---|--|---|---|---|---|
| System design | Personal carbon credit trade implementing a parallel currency (volume solution). | Industrial carbon credit tra- emitting sectors (| | Carbon credit for fossil fuel conveyors (volume solution). | Energy tax combined with eco dividends (pricing solution). | Carbon consumption of specific sectors is taxed (pricing solution) |
| Working principle | Confronted with a limited carbon credit allowance, the population's demand will automatically shift from climate damaging products and services to climate friendly ones – those with a lower ECO price. Distributed free of cost prevents direct price increases. ECO can only be traded by consumers. | limited amount of carbon credits which could then be traded on a market. Companies emitting larger GRG volumes than their carbon credits allowed, could buy more certificates | | Greenhouse gas emissions are to be reduced by issuing a limited number of emission rights and then trading them on a market. Companies that emit larger quantities of climate-damaging gases than their allowances permit can buy additional allowances. Companies that emit little can sell. | Inflationary prices aim to deter climate damaging consumer habits. The population is thusly encouraged to limit carbon-intensive consumption or choose climate-friendly products. Incoming revenues are redistributed equally among the population. | Inflationary prices aim to deter climate damaging consumer habits. The population is thusly encouraged to limit carbon-intensive consumption or choose climate-friendly products. |
| Implementation | Every citizen (resident) has a limited personal carbon credit allowance . Logically, industries will no longer find profit in polluting products, but will automatically shift to low/no-emission processes, following the consumer trend to ECO-affordable climate friendly products. | A reduction in the manufacture of pollutive products and services is attained by limiting carbon credits (cap). | A reduction in the manufacture of pollutive products and services is attained by limiting carbon credits (cap) and by an inflationary carbon pricing signal since certificate costs are transferred onto consumer products. | A reduction in the manufacture of pollutive products and services is attained by limiting carbon credits (cap) and by an inflationary carbon pricing signal since certificate costs are transferred onto consumer products. | Inflationary prices aim to deter climate damaging consumer habits. | Inflationary prices aim to deter climate damaging consumer habits. |
| Dissemination | Planned for (initially) within the EU Concept: Climate protection initiative SaveClimate.Earth | Active since 2005 in 31 European countries (27 EU members, plus Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland) | | Planned for (initially) within the EU Concept: Prof. Dr. Felix Ekardt | Switzerland Steering tax since 2008 | Established in a variety of desings in divers countries worldwide |
| Sectors included | Cross-sector, comprehensive | Limited to selceted sectors. Currently, approximately 11,000 factories and power stations in 27 EU countries participate in ETS. Participating Sectors: Thermic power stations > 20MW, refineries, blast furnaces, cement industries, aviation, chemical industries and so on. (Extension to buildings and traffic planned for 2026) | | cross-sector, comprehensive | Limited to heating oil and natural gas sectors | Currently limited to heating and transport sectors |
| Carbon emissions covered | 100% | approx. 40 % of carbon em | nissions emitteed in the EU | 100% | 40% | Currently limited to emission from the heating and transport sectors |
| Targeted greenhouse gases | CO ₂ (extendable to other GHGs) | CO₂ N₂O (laughing gas) perfluorocarbons (PFCs) | | CO ₂ | CO ₂ | CO ₂ |
| Distribution procedure | Cost-free, monthly ecological basic income for all residents | Cost-free certificate distribution (40%) The certificate volume has be | Auctioning certificates (60%) een reduced according to EU | Auctioning certificates | not applicable | not applicable |
| | | reduction goals. | | | | |
| Emissions reduction efficiency | high | | dium | high | low | low |
| | All sectors are integrated. Emissions are limited to the ECO distribution volume which reflects the entire emissions budget. | Not all sectors are integrate further due to over-allocation a | d. Low certificate prices sink and subsidized electricity costs. | All sectors are integrated. Emissions are limited to the certificate volume that reflects the entire emissions budget. | Not all sectors integrated, no cap. | Not all sectors integrated, no cap |
| Climate price transparency | high | lo | ow . | medium | low | low |
| | | Since certificate costs are added to economic costs, end-users cannot differentiate the climate costs of a given product or service. The added ecological footprint cost is buried in the economic price. | | | Since carbon costs are added onto economic product prices, it is nearly impossible for end users to discern the climate impact of a given product. The extra charge representing a product's carbon footprint cannot be clearly traced. | Since carbon costs are added onto economic product prices, it is nearly impossible for end users to discern the climate impact of a given product. The extra charge representing a product's carbon footprint cannot be clearly traced. |
| Budgeting | yes via limited ressource currency | Via limited certificate amou | es int, although over allocation ginal budgeting. | yes via limited certificate amount. | no Works exclusively via inflationary consumer prices. | no Works exclusively via inflationary consumer prices. |
| Greenflation | no | no | yes | yes | partially | yes |
| | No additional financial burden on households, the personal carbon credit allowance is distributed free of cost. | No additional financial burden on households, the personal carbon credit allowance is distributed free of cost. | The costs of the certificates are passed on to consumers. This places a disproportionate burden on low-income earners. | The costs of the certificates are passed on to consumers. This places a disproportionate burden on low-income earners. | 2/3 of incoming tax revenue is redistributed equally among the population. | Tax is applied to product prices, generating price increases which disproportionately overburden low-income households. |
| Inflationary | no The ECO parallel currency is wholly independent of the national currency. | not applicable Certificates are gratis. | yes Certificate prices are redefined at each auctioning, according to the current monetary value. | yes Certificate prices are redefined at each auctioning, according to the current monetary value. | a measurable impact. | yes The carbon tax must grow with inflation in order to have a measurable impact. |
| Pricing tradeable carbon credits on the Climate Exchange | yes Supply and demand determine the prices (in national currency)for ECOs traded on the Climate Exchange. | yes Although certificates are gratis, the trade price is determined by suppy and demand. | yes Certificate prices emerge during auctioning and trade prices are determined by suppy and demand. | yes Certificate prices emerge during auctioning and trade prices are determined by suppy and demand. | not applicable | not applicable |

| | | I | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|---|--|--|---|
| Supranational administrative effort | high | med | dium | medium | not applicable | not applicable |
| | Establishing and managing the Climate Bank Establishing and adminstrating climate accounts Establishing and managing the Climate Exchange | The internationally traded of administration | | Since certificates are traded internationally, establishing and managing a higher platform is required. | | |
| National administrative effort | low | high | | medium | low | low |
| | Monitoring conveyor's ECO payment-output balance Monitoring fossil fuel output-ECO distribution balance Autonomous ECO pricing along the value chain has no need for legislative control or administrative effort | managed individually Intensive bureaucratic effort in many extraneous areas Necessary measures to integrate sectors not yet active in the emissions trade would massively increase administrative efforts | | Auctioning certificates Monitoring output-certificate balance Controlling correct GHG pricing Organizing and controlling redistribution auction revenues | Law-makers determine both the carbon tax percentage and the products to be levied/burdened Tax revenue distribution continues to require administrative effort | Law-makers determine both the carbon tax percentage and the products to be levied/burdened Tax revenue distribution continues to require administrative effort |
| Administrative effort for | high | low | medium | high | low | low |
| businesses Unternehmen | Calculating and paying ECO costs Double-entry accounting for the climate price | Managing certificate trade and encashment | Transferring auctioned certificate costs onto end products | Calculating and paying certificate costs Double-entry accounting for the climate price | The carbon tax is a common operating cost for businesses and an integrated product cost for consumers. | The carbon tax is a common operating cost for businesses and an integrated product cost for consumers. |
| Price consistency for industries | medium | hi | gh | high | medium | high |
| and consumers | Cyclic adjustment of the ECO distribution volume impedes price consistency for both industries and consumers | The cap is defined and predictable for a given trade period. However, supply and demand at certificate auctioning and trade makes price developments difficult to foresee. | | The cap is defined and predictable for a given trade period. However, supply and demand at certificate auctioning and trade makes price developments difficult to foresee. | New referenda have the power to adjust the control tax at any time. | Allowable price increases per carbon ton are given for a defined period of time |
| Administrative effort for | high | not app | plicable | not applicable | not applicable | not applicable |
| consumers | Managing (possible) Climate Exchange trades. Household management of two accounts/budgets | | | | | |
| Fairness | yes | n | 10 | no | yes | yes |
| | Carbon credits for the entire population includes everyone. | Limited to specific industrial sectors. No direct inclusion of consumers/citizens | | Limited to specific fossil fuel conveyors sectors. No direct inclusion of consumers/citizens | By taxing end products and subsequently refunding the taxpayers, the system impacts all consumers/citizens | By taxing end products, all consumers are impacted |
| | high | medium | low | low | low | low |
| Consumer justice | No additional financial burden on households, the personal carbon credit allowance is distributed free of cost. Every citizen receives the same carbon credit allowance (basic ecological income) for blanket public acceptance. Low-carbon consumers (as rule poorer people) can sell excess ECOs on the Climate Exchange, while high-carbon consumers (as a rule wealthier people) can buy them, resulting in not only an additional source of income for low-income households, but also a wealth gap offset. This generates a most welcome increase in social justice. | | consumers. • Low income households are disproportionately overburdened. • Entrenches the wealth gap • Unfair certificate auctioning procedure favors wealthy | Certificate costs are borne by consumers. Low income households are disproportionately overburdened. Entrenches the wealth gap | The carbon tax is borne by consumers. Low income households are disproportionately overburdened. Refunds are distributed indiscriminately, meaning wealthy households receive an equal share Entrenches the wealth gap | The carbon tax is borne by consumers. Low income households are disproportionately overburdened. Many cannot afford a price increase while others take no notice. Entrenches the wealth gap |
| Social balancing | high | n | 10 | medium | high | medium |
| | Tradeable on the Climate Exchange (citizens only) Low-carbon consumers (as rule poorer people) can sell excess ECOs on the Climate Exchange, while high-carbon consumers (as a rule wealthier people) can buy them, resulting in an additional source of income for low-income households. Facilitates a balance between rich and poor, offsetting the wealth gap. | | | Auctiong revenues ago to (among others): • increasing enemployment benefits • Lowering energy bills for low-income households • Financing energy efficient/sufficient programs • Supporting developing countries | Climate friendly habits are rewarded with refunds. However, refunding is non-selective, wealthy households receive an equal share of refunds. | The German government reinvestscarbon tax revenues in climate-friendly transport, energy-efficient buildings and/or taxpayer bonuses with • Lowering EEG apportionment • Raising housing allowances • Raising commuting allowances • Providing mobility bonuses |
| Based on the polluter principle | yes | n | 10 | no | yes | yes |
| | Industrial commodity production is not an end in itself, but responds to supply and demand. Therefore, the ECO works directly with the polluter principle, placing responsibility for climate protection COMPLETELY in the hands of the smallest component on the market. ALL consumers with their vast steering effect directly influence industrial manufacturing processes. | Carbon credit trade on a superordinate level overlooks the smallest component on the market - the consumer - with his/her enormous steering impact. | | Carbon credit trade on a superordinate level overlooks the smallest component on the market - the consumer - with his/her enormous steering impact. | Taxing consumer products directly addresses polluters, i.e., end customers. | Taxing consumer products directly addresses polluters, i.e., end customers. |
| Consumer freedom | high | med | dium | medium | medium | medium |
| | Allows maximum buying freedom within clearly defined ecological limits without additional inflation. All consumers can personally choose climate friendly or climate damaging products. Consumer freedom for all citizens is ensured within their personal climate allowance, which is the same for everyone. | • | s to cover certificate costs mer freedom of low-income sholds. | The additional price hikes to cover certificate costs increasingly limit the consumer freedom of low-income households | Carbon tax price hikes increasingly limit the consumer freedom of low-income households. | Carbon tax price hikes increasingly limit the consumer freedom of low-income households. |

| Industrial outsourcing risk (Carbon Leakage) | low | low | high | high | low | low |
|--|--|---|---|--|--|--|
| (Carbon Ecanage) | Leaving the RCU (Resource Currency Union) is only attractive for industries that wish to manufacture exclusively for markets outside the RCU and do not wish to trade within the RCU. Since, logically, importing fossil fuel-produced products into the RCU will be subject to ECO pricing according to their carbon content and subsequently paid by consumers. | Gratis certificate distribution counteracts the risk of outsourcing to third countries that do not participate in certificate trade. | The risk of outsourcing production to third countries is high for carbon-intensive industries unwilling to take part in certificate trade, thereby avoiding the cap within the economic sphere. The same risk applies to companies that refuse to invest in converting production processes to climate friendly ones. | The risk of outsourcing production to third countries is high for carbon-intensive industries unwilling to take part in certificate trade, thereby avoiding the cap within the economic sphere. The same risk applies to companies that refuse to invest in converting production processes to climate friendly ones. | Since carbon tax costs are transferred to consumers, carbon-intensive industries have no incentive to outsource manufacturing to third countries. | Since carbon tax costs are transferred to consumers, carbon-intensive industries have no incentive to outsource manufacturing to third countries. |
| Manipulation security | high | medium | medium | medium | high | high |
| | Closed circulation prevents price manipulation since each step in the value chain must pay ECO invoices from preceding steps with ECO gained from the downstream processes. Companies cannot capitalize on ECO overpricing as they are excluded from Climate Exchange trade. Excess ECO | limit regulation infringements • Cap is possible to circumvent: over-reaching emissions limits are merely fined • Certificate speculation is possible | Carbon leakage Blast furnaces over 20MW can split certificates to avoid limit regulation infringements Cap is possible to circumvent: over-reaching emissions limits are merely fined Certificate speculation is possible | Carbon leakage Without sufficient monitoring, the ecological price percentage can be intentionally set lower (Greenwashing) Certificate speculation possible | | |
| Interoperability | yes | limi | ted | limited | not applicable | not applicable |
| | international economic processes (import/export) • ECO is a complementary, globally valid, uniform | To prevent unfair competition must be consistent throughout converted within all currency sy Importing climate damaging participating countries counters | t all participating countrie and ystems. products from non- | To prevent unfair competition, carbon certificate prices must be consistent throughout all participating countrie and converted within all currency systems. Importing climate damaging products from non-participating countries counteracts Upstream ETS | | |
| Electricity subsidization | not applicable | not applicable | yes | no available data | not applicable | not applicable |
| | | | Energy-intensive companies receive subsidies to maintain international competetiveness. This further reduces EU-ETS efficacy. | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| Flexibility for dynamic climate | high | med | lium | high | medium | medium |
| Flexibility for dynamic climate goals | high The ECO distribution volume can be adapted to the emissions budget at any time. This flexible system steering allows a consistently precise attainment of emissions goals. | Since certificate distribution given trade period, flexible cap conditions | volumes are frozen within a adaptation to altered climate | high The certificate volume cap for mining companies can be adapted to a determined emissions budget at any time. This flexible system steering allows a consistently precise attainment of emissions goals. | medium Referenda determine the carbon tax price percentage and cannot be flexibly adapted to dynamic climate goals. | medium The carbon tax graduation has already been set until 2026 and cannot be flexibly adapted to dynamic climate goals. |
| | The ECO distribution volume can be adapted to the emissions budget at any time. This flexible system steering allows a consistently precise attainment of | Since certificate distribution given trade period, flexible cap | volumes are frozen within a adaptation to altered climate | The certificate volume cap for mining companies can be adapted to a determined emissions budget at any time. This flexible system steering allows a consistently precise | Referenda determine the carbon tax price percentage | The carbon tax graduation has already been set until 2026 and cannot be flexibly adapted to dynamic climate |
| goals | The ECO distribution volume can be adapted to the emissions budget at any time. This flexible system steering allows a consistently precise attainment of emissions goals. | Since certificate distribution given trade period, flexible cap conditions | volumes are frozen within a adaptation to altered climate is difficult. | The certificate volume cap for mining companies can be adapted to a determined emissions budget at any time. This flexible system steering allows a consistently precise attainment of emissions goals. | Referenda determine the carbon tax price percentage and cannot be flexibly adapted to dynamic climate goals. | The carbon tax graduation has already been set until 2026 and cannot be flexibly adapted to dynamic climate goals. |
| goals | The ECO distribution volume can be adapted to the emissions budget at any time. This flexible system steering allows a consistently precise attainment of emissions goals. high Changing the ECO distribution volume has an immediate impact on consumer demand and subsequently, on | Since certificate distribution given trade period, flexible cap conditions low Since certificates are cost-free, there is little incentive for investing in greener | volumes are frozen within a adaptation to altered climate is difficult. medium Certificate costs are transferred to the consumer, leaving little incentive for investing in greener processes. | The certificate volume cap for mining companies can be adapted to a determined emissions budget at any time. This flexible system steering allows a consistently precise attainment of emissions goals. high Changing the certificate volume for mining companies has an immediate impact on consumer demand and | Referenda determine the carbon tax price percentage and cannot be flexibly adapted to dynamic climate goals. high Changing the carbon tax price percentage has an immediate impact on consumer demand and | The carbon tax graduation has already been set until 2026 and cannot be flexibly adapted to dynamic climate goals. high Changing the carbon tax price percentage has an immediate impact on consumer demand and |
| Impact speed | The ECO distribution volume can be adapted to the emissions budget at any time. This flexible system steering allows a consistently precise attainment of emissions goals. high Changing the ECO distribution volume has an immediate impact on consumer demand and subsequently, on carbon emissions. | Since certificate distribution given trade period, flexible cap conditions low Since certificates are cost-free, there is little incentive for investing in greener processes. | volumes are frozen within a adaptation to altered climate is difficult. medium Certificate costs are transferred to the consumer, leaving little incentive for investing in greener processes. | The certificate volume cap for mining companies can be adapted to a determined emissions budget at any time. This flexible system steering allows a consistently precise attainment of emissions goals. high Changing the certificate volume for mining companies has an immediate impact on consumer demand and subsequently, on carbon emissions. | Referenda determine the carbon tax price percentage and cannot be flexibly adapted to dynamic climate goals. high Changing the carbon tax price percentage has an immediate impact on consumer demand and subsequently, on carbon emissions. | The carbon tax graduation has already been set until 2026 and cannot be flexibly adapted to dynamic climate goals. high Changing the carbon tax price percentage has an immediate impact on consumer demand and subsequently, on carbon emissions. |
| Impact speed | The ECO distribution volume can be adapted to the emissions budget at any time. This flexible system steering allows a consistently precise attainment of emissions goals. high Changing the ECO distribution volume has an immediate impact on consumer demand and subsequently, on carbon emissions. yes Private citizens (only) have the right to trade ECOs on the | Since certificate distribution given trade period, flexible cap conditions low Since certificates are cost-free, there is little incentive for investing in greener processes. | volumes are frozen within a adaptation to altered climate is difficult. medium Certificate costs are transferred to the consumer, leaving little incentive for investing in greener processes. | The certificate volume cap for mining companies can be adapted to a determined emissions budget at any time. This flexible system steering allows a consistently precise attainment of emissions goals. high Changing the certificate volume for mining companies has an immediate impact on consumer demand and subsequently, on carbon emissions. | Referenda determine the carbon tax price percentage and cannot be flexibly adapted to dynamic climate goals. high Changing the carbon tax price percentage has an immediate impact on consumer demand and subsequently, on carbon emissions. | The carbon tax graduation has already been set until 2026 and cannot be flexibly adapted to dynamic climate goals. high Changing the carbon tax price percentage has an immediate impact on consumer demand and subsequently, on carbon emissions. |
| Impact speed Tradeable | The ECO distribution volume can be adapted to the emissions budget at any time. This flexible system steering allows a consistently precise attainment of emissions goals. high Changing the ECO distribution volume has an immediate impact on consumer demand and subsequently, on carbon emissions. yes Private citizens (only) have the right to trade ECOs on the Climate Exchange. | Since certificate distribution given trade period, flexible cap conditions low Since certificates are cost-free, there is little incentive for investing in greener processes. | volumes are frozen within a adaptation to altered climate is difficult. medium Certificate costs are transferred to the consumer, leaving little incentive for investing in greener processes. | The certificate volume cap for mining companies can be adapted to a determined emissions budget at any time. This flexible system steering allows a consistently precise attainment of emissions goals. high Changing the certificate volume for mining companies has an immediate impact on consumer demand and subsequently, on carbon emissions. yes Mining companies can trade certificates. | Referenda determine the carbon tax price percentage and cannot be flexibly adapted to dynamic climate goals. high Changing the carbon tax price percentage has an immediate impact on consumer demand and subsequently, on carbon emissions. | The carbon tax graduation has already been set until 2026 and cannot be flexibly adapted to dynamic climate goals. high Changing the carbon tax price percentage has an immediate impact on consumer demand and subsequently, on carbon emissions. not applicable |

| Efficacy | very high | low | high | very low | very low |
|----------|--|--|--|---|--|
| SUMMARY! | The ECO is a carbon credit trade system working on the private population/consumer level. | The EU ETS is an emissions trading system for large emitters, limited to defined sectors, which does not directly involve citizens. Emissions trading on such a superordinate level does | The Upstream ETS is an emissions trading system for producers of fossil primary energy sources that was initially to be established within the EU. | The CO2 tax system is a national instrument and includes an energy price combined with an eco-bonus as a dividend. | The CO2 tax system is a national emissions trading system with a fixed price, during the introductory phase until 2026. |
| | The ECO is a socially inclusive, volume-based solution, rationing emissions with a complementary currency which should be initially implemented throughout the European union. | not sufficiently take into account the smallest unit in the market, the consumers, with their enormous steering effect. It is a volume-based emissions quota solution introduced in | The system is a volume-based emission quota solution in the form of tradable certificates that does not directly involve citizens. | This incentive tax represents a monetary solution for society as a whole without a CAP, in which all citizens are involved. | This incentive tax represents a monetary solution for society as a whole without a CAP, in which all citizens are involved. |
| | Confronted with a limited carbon credit allowance, the population's demand will automatically shift from climate damaging products and services to climate | 2005 in the form of tradable certificates, whose issuance volume is reduced annually. 40% of the certificates are currently issued free of charge. The remaining 60% are allocated by auction. It is difficult to flexibly adapt the CAP to | The CAP of the allowance volume for the sponsoring companies could be adjusted at any time according to the decided emission budget. The emission target would | The taxation of consumption is based on the end consumer. | The taxation of consumption is based on the end consumer. |
| | friendly ones – those with a lower ECO price. The ECO stands out by directly addressing the polluter | changing conditions, as the volume of certificates issued is fixed in the current trading period. | always be exactly reached due to flexible controllability of the system. | The ton of CO2 is charged with an additional price. The amount can be influenced by referendum in accordance with agreed climate targets. | The ton of CO2 is subject to an additional price, the amount of which is adjusted upwards each year. From 2026 onwards, the certificates must be purchased at |
| | G | Since only 11,000 companies within 27 countries of the EU (plus Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland) participate, only about 40% of all emissions are covered. Covered sectors: electricity generation by thermal power plants > 20MW, | All allowances must be auctioned. The system covers all sectors, so that 100% of the emissions are covered. | So far, only heating oil and natural gas are affected by this tax, which is why only 40% of CO2 emissions are covered. | auction. Prices are determined by supply and demand. So far, only heating and gasoline costs have been affected by this tax, which is why it does not cover all |
| | With limited personal carbon credits, consumers themselves reduce climate damaging product manufacture. Industries automatically convert to lowemission production in response to consumer demand for | refineries, high furnaces, cement industry, aviation, chemical industry, etc. (additional extension to buildings and transport planned in yeshr 2026). | This system offers transparency with regard to the climate price, as this is managed as a separate euro price along the entire value chain. However, this price is | The additional costs are passed on to the end consumers, so that lower-income households are disproportionately affected by this surcharge. | emissions. The additional costs are passed on to end consumers, so that lower-income households are disproportionately |
| | climate-friendly products. The ECO is distributed free of cost, there is no direct inflationary impact. The total emissions budget is distributed equally among | The EU-ETS offers hardly any transparency regarding the climate price, since the costs of the certificates are not priced separately. | inaccurate because its ecological significance is reduced by the trading margins of the certificate prices. For consumers, there is no reference value to evaluate the reported ecological price. | Climate-friendly consumption is rewarded through rebates. 2/3 of the revenue from this tax is returned to the population and the economy. However, the rebate takes place according to the watering can principle. Even | affected by this surcharge. The federal government reinvests the revenue from the CO2 price in climate-friendly transport and energy-efficient buildings or as relief for citizens in the form of a reduction in the EEG |
| | all citizens. Every natural person receives a monthly ecological basic income, his or her personal carbon credit allowance, free | There is a risk of inflation of the primary currency through increased consumption ("greenflation"), because the costs of the certificates are passed on to the end consumers. Lower-income households are disproportionately affected by this | There is a risk of inflation of the primary currency through increased consumption ("greenflation"), because the costs of the certificates are passed on to the end | very wealthy households receive a rebate in the same amount The CO2 price must grow with inflation, otherwise its | levy, an increase in housing subsidies, an increase in the tax-free distance allowance and the granting of mobility bonuses. |
| | of cost. Companies do not have an ECO allowance. All goods and services have an additional ECO pricetag. | surcharge. There is no direct social compensation for citizens. | consumers. Lower-income households are disproportionately affected by this surcharge. | effect is reduced. The CO2 tax offers hardly any transparency with regard | The CO2 price must grow with inflation, otherwise its effect is reduced. |
| | This climate price reflects the sum total of carbon emitted along the product's or service's entire value chain and is paid in ECOs, drawing on the consumer's personal ECO account. Consumers are empowered to directly compare | The certificate prices are inflation-dependent and are determined at each auction. Their level is determined by supply and demand. The allocation procedure via auctioning | Social compensation is achieved by indirectly returning auctioning proceeds to citizens through increased social benefits, by financing programs for energy efficiency and sufficiency, and by leaving the proceeds to developing | to the climate price, since the costs are not priced separately. The governmental effort is rather low and is limited to | The CO2 tax offers little transparency with regard to the climate price, since the costs are not priced separately. The governmental effort is rather low and is limited to |
| | the climate impact of products and actively choose the more climate friendly option. This allows for maximal freedom for all consumers within clearly defined limits. | is unfair, because financially stronger companies (can) purchase larger quantities of certificates at auction. CO2 certificate prices must be the same internationally within all participating countries in order to prevent distortions of | countries. The certificate prices are inflation-dependent and change with each auction. Their level is determined by supply | the specification of the tax rate and the distribution of the collected taxes. The additional effort for the companies is limited to the | the specification of the tax rate and the distribution of the collected taxes. The additional effort for the companies is limited to the |
| | Natural persons can sell their excess ECOs for local cash currency at the Climate Exchange. Exchange prices are determined by suppy and demand. This ensures low-carbon consumers an additional financial resource. | competition. Since certificates are traded internationally, the operation of a superordinate platform is necessary. | and demand. Certificate prices must be the same internationally within all participating countries in order to prevent distortions of competition. | accounting and collection of the CO2 price as a transitory item. There is no risk of carbon leakage. | accounting and collection of the CO2 price as a transitory item. There is no risk of carbon leakage. |
| | Hence, the ECO contributes to reducing the wealth gap. All sectors are covered without exception, ECO payment begins at the source - fossil fuel conveyors. The ECO price | The governmental effort is very high, because all participating companies have to be registered and controlled. | Since certificates are traded internationally, it is necessary to establish and operate a superordinate platform. | The manipulation security is very high. The CO2 tax is exclusively a national instrument. | The manipulation security is very high. The CO2 tax is exclusively a national instrument. |
| | on end products reflects the amount of carbon emitted throughout a given product's entire production process. Ultimately, the price paid by a consumer is returned to the fossil fuel conveyor. The ECO distribution volume is equal to the entire emissions budget^and cannot be | Companies must pass on the costs of the auctioned certificates to their products. There is no additional effort on the part of citizens. | The governmental effort is midling and mainly caused by the certificate auction, the monitoring of the production volumes and the distribution of funds of the auction proceeds. In addition, the correct pricing of the GHG fraction must be monitored. | The CO2 tax is exclusively a national histrument. | The CO2 tax is exclusively a national instrument. |
| | overdrawn. There is little national administratiive effort. Only fossile fuel conveyors must be monitored at the system's bottleneck, so to speak. ECO-pricing ensues | The system can be manipulated by companies > 20MW sharing their combustion site in order not to fall under the scheme. Exceeding the cap will only result in a penalty fee. | Companies must allocate the cost of auctioned allowances to their products. Since the climate price is shown separately on the final product, double-entry bookkeeping is necessary. | | |
| | autonomously and incorruptibly, without governing influence. Supranational effort entails establishing a Climate Bank with climate accounts as well as setting up the Climate Exchange for ECO trade. | There is a risk of carbon leakage to avoid necessary investments in climate-friendly transformation processes. | There is no additional effort on the part of citizens. There is a risk of carbon leakage in order to avoid the CAP | | |
| | Consumer households have two account/budgets to manage as well as potential Climate Exchange activities. | Imports of climate-damaging goods from non-participating countries counteract the effectiveness of the EU ETS. The effectiveness of the EU ETS is further reduced because | of fossil fuel production within the economic area and to avoid having to invest in the conversion of production processes towards climate-friendly procedures. | | |
| | The ECO carbon-pricing and carbon-accounting system is impossible to manipulate. The fixed ECO sum is generated over a closed circulation. The final ECO price is automatically correct. Since industries are excluded from | energy-intensive companies receive electricity price compensation to ensure international competitiveness. | The ecological price share could be intentionally underpriced (greenwashing) in case of insufficient control. | | |
| | Climate Exchange trade, they cannot capitalize on excess ECOS. ECO underpricing also backfires as it leads to an ECO deficit and companies cannot pay their precursors. This completely rules out price manipulation. Businesses merely pass on accrued ECO costs, which calls for double-entry accounting. | | Imports of climate-damaging goods from non- participating countries counteract the effectiveness of the upstream ETS. | | |
| | Immune to carbon leakage. Fossil fuel-produced goods imported to the RCU are ECO priced according to their carbon content before being sold to end customers. | | | | |
| | There is no risk of primary currency inflation (greenflation). The personal carbon credits are distributed free of cost. "Artificial" carbon pricing and its ensuing inflation is impossible. Consumer households are not further financially burden. As a complementary currency wholly detached from national currency, the ECO system is inflation-proof. | | | | |
| | The ECO can be well integrated into existing national and international economic processes (import/export). | | | | |
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